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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Joseph Luther Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count of felony robbery, and the
district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.
Mr. Jacobs filed an untimely notice of appeal. He also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the district court denied.
Mr. Jacobs subsequently began the present post-conviction proceeding.

The

district court rejected Mr. Jacobs' assertions that there had been ineffective assistance
of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental health
evaluation, and that he was entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of newly
discovered evidence that would require vacation of the sentence in the interest of
justice.

Thus, the district court summarily dismissed, with prejudice, Count One of

Mr. Jacobs' amended petition for post-conviction relief. The parties then stipulated that
there was good cause to grant Mr. Jacobs relief on Count Two of the amended petition
(which asserted that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel did not file a timely appeal as Mr. Jacobs wanted). The district court held that
Mr. Jacobs was entitled to reentry of judgment in the underlying criminal case and to file
a timely appeal in that case.
Mr. Jacobs appealed, asserting that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing with prejudice Count One of the amended petition because he presented
prima facie evidence that newly discovered evidence required vacation of the sentence

in the interest of justice, as well as prima facie evidence that there had been ineffective
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assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental
health evaluation.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Jacobs waived his newly
discovered evidence assertion on appeal because he did not provided the legal
argument necessary to support that assertion, and that Mr. Jacobs did not show any
error in the district court's summary dismissal of his assertion that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the mental health evaluation, in part because the ICC
mental health assessments did not provide any new information. (Resp. Br., pp.7-12.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments that Mr. Jacobs
waived his newly discovered evidence assertion on appeal, and that the ICC mental
health assessments did not provide any new information. Mr. Jacobs has not waived
his newly discovered evidence assertion on appeal, because he presented argument
and authority sufficient to support that assertion.

The legal argument the State

contends is "necessary to support" that assertion is irrelevant where, as in this case, a
petitioner has requested vacation of a sentence as post-conviction relief.

Further,

contrary to the State's argument, the ICC mental health assessments provided
new evidence.
Mr. Jacobs challenges the State's broader argument that he did not present
prima facie evidence that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel because his

trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental health evaluation, but he relies on the
arguments contained in his Appellant's Brief on that point and will not repeat
them herein.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Jacobs' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed, with prejudice, Count One of
Mr. Jacobs' amended petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed, With Prejudice, Count One Of
Mr. Jacobs' Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Mr. Jacobs asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed, with

prejudice, Count One of the amended petition, because he presented prima facie
evidence that newly discovered evidence required the vacation of the sentence in the
interest of justice, as well as prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel
on the

basis

of his trial

counsel's failure to

challenge the original

mental

health evaluation.

B.

Mr. Jacobs Presented Prima Facie Evidence That Newly Discovered Evidence
Required Vacation Of The Sentence In The Interest Of Justice
Mr. Jacobs asserts that he presented prima facie evidence that newly discovered

evidence required vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice. The ICC mental
health assessments completed after sentencing raise a genuine issue of material fact
sufficient to survive summary dismissal, because they set forth evidence of material
facts that would require vacation of his sentence under I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4).
Rather than make a substantive argument on the merits regarding this assertion
(see Resp. Br., pp.7-12), the State argues that Mr. Jacobs "has waived his newly
discovered evidence claim on appeal, and this Court should not consider it." (Resp.
Br., p.7 n.3 (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).) According to the State,
Mr. Jacobs waived the newly discovered evidence assertion through not "provid[ing] the
legal argument necessary to support his claim," because he has not addressed "the
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Drapeau four-factor test." 1 (Resp. Br., p.7 n.3.) As the Idaho Supreme Court held in
Zichko, "When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or
argument, they will not be considered." Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. "A party waives an
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking." Id.
Mr. Jacobs has not waived his newly discovered evidence assertion on appeal,
because he presented argument and authority sufficient to support that assertion.
Where (as in this case) a petitioner requests the vacation of a sentence in a postconviction proceeding based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must show
"that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." See I.C. § 19-

4901 (a)(4); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 437, 440 (Ct. App. 2007). "An applicant
must prevent evidence of facts that existed at the time of sentencing that would have
been relevant to the sentencing process and that indicate the information available to
the parties or the trial court at the time of sentencing was false, incomplete, or otherwise
materially misleading." Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440.
Here, Mr. Jacobs asserted that the district court erred in summarily dismissing
with prejudice Count One of the amended petition, because he presented prima facie
evidence that newly discovered evidence required vacation of the sentence in the

1

The test from State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976), provides that, in the context of
motions for a new trial:
A motion based on newly discovered evidence must disclose (1) that the
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the
time of trial; (2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (3) that it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that
failure to learn of the evidence was due in no part to lack of diligence on
the part of the defendant.
Id. at 691.
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interest of justice.

As required by Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263,

(App. Br., pp.12-13.)

Mr. Jacobs supported this assertion with authority and argument in the Appellant's Brief
regarding the showing he had to make pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4) and Knutsen.
(See App. Br., pp.13-16.)
Contrary to the State's argument, Mr. Jacobs has not waived his newly
discovered evidence assertion on appeal. The legal argument the State contends is
"necessary to support" that assertion is irrelevant where a petitioner has requested
vacation of a sentence as post-conviction relief.

Although the State alleges that a

defendant "must satisfy" the Drapeau test "in order to be entitled to relief based upon a
post-conviction claim of newly discovered evidence" (Resp. Br., p.7 n.3), the Drapeau
test actually applies only where a petitioner requests a new trial in a post-conviction
proceeding based on newly discovered evidence. In Whiteley v. State, 131 Idaho 323
(1998), a case cited by the State (Resp. Br., p.7 n.3), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that "the request for a new trial in a post-conviction proceeding based on newly
discovered evidence is the same as a motion for new trial subsequent to a jury verdict.
Before a new trial can be granted, and irrespective of the form of the request, new
evidence must satisfy the four-part test set forth in [Drapeau]." Whiteley, 131 Idaho at
326 (internal citation omitted).
The Drapeau test for new trial motions, rather than being "necessary to support"
Mr. Jacobs' newly discovered evidence assertion, is irrelevant to his assertion. Instead
of requesting a new trial, Mr.Jacobs requested the vacation of his sentence.
Confidential Exs., p.7; see also R., p.8.)

(See

Thus, rather than needing to address the

Drapeau test, Mr. Jacobs had to address whether "there exists evidence of material
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facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest of justice." See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440. As discussed
above, Mr. Jacobs addressed that point through presenting authority and argument in
the Appellant's Brief. (See App. Br., pp.13-16.) Further, the State has made no effort to
explain how Mr. Jacobs could have requested a new trial as post-conviction relief,
considering he pleaded guilty through a plea agreement and therefore did not even
have a trial in the underlying case. (See Confidential Exs., pp.2-3; R., pp.51-52.) Thus,
Mr. Jacobs has not waived his newly discovered evidence assertion on appeal.
In the Respondent's Brief, the State did not present any substantive arguments
on the merits to counter Mr. Jacobs' newly discovered evidence assertion. (See Resp.
Br., pp.7-12.)

As shown in the Appellant's Brief (App Br., pp.13-16), Mr. Jacobs

presented prima facie evidence that newly discovered evidence required vacation of the
sentence in the interest of justice. The district court's order summarily dismissing Count
One of the amended petition should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for
an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Jacobs is entitled to resentencing in light of the
ICC mental health assessments.

C.

Mr. Jacobs Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of The Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel Based On His Trial Counsel's Failure To Challenge The Original Mental
Health Evaluation
Mr. Jacobs asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of the ineffective

assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental
health evaluation, because he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his
trial counsel's failure was objectively unreasonable, and as to whether he was
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure.
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The State has adopted the district court's reasoning for why the failure to
challenge the original mental health evaluation was properly summarily dismissed
(Resp. Br., p.10), which Mr. Jacobs has already addressed in the Appellant's Brief.
(App. Br., pp.16-19.) Further, the State argues that Mr. Jacobs has not shown "any
error in [the] district court's summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim," because the ICC mental health assessments "did not provide any information
the district court did not have before it at [Mr.] Jacobs' sentencing hearing." (Resp.
Br., p.12.) However, the ICC mental health assessments provided new evidence.
The original mental health evaluation reported that Mr. Jacobs began to struggle
"with a low mood in February, 2011 .... During this time period [Mr. Jacobs] identified
he was sad, hopeless, and felt out of control." (Confidential Exs., pp.26, 29.) The State
argues that "feeling 'out of control,' especially combined with feeling sad and hopeless,
denotes the possibility that a person's judgment has been impacted and compromised."
(Resp. Br., p.12.)

The State also contends the original mental health evaluation's

statement that "[a]t that time Mr. Jacobs could have met DSM-IV criteria for adjustment
Disorder with Depressed Mood" (Confidential Exs., p.29), "informed the court all the
more that [Mr.] Jacobs' judgment may well have been impacted by his 'psychosocial
stressors."' (Resp. Br., p.12.)
The State essentially argues that the ICC mental health assessments did not
provide any new evidence, because the district court could have inferred from the
original mental health evaluation that Mr. Jacobs' judgment could have been impacted
and compromised by his psychological stressors. However, this argument obscures the
difference between evidence and inferences from that evidence.
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See also State v.

Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 216 (Ct. App. 1997) (observing, in the context of search warrant
affidavits, that "[t]he magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence presented.") "Evidence" is defined as, "Something ... that tends to prove or
disprove the existence of an alleged fact." Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009). "Inference" is defined as, "A conclusion reached by considering other facts and
deducing a logical consequence from them," and as "The process by which such a
conclusion is reached; the process of thought by which one moves from evidence to
proof." Inference, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
Even assuming that the district court could-and did-conclude from the original
mental health evaluation that Mr. Jacobs' judgment could have been impacted and
compromised by his psychosocial stressors, the district court's conclusion would have
been an inference, not evidence. The only way the original mental health evaluation
would have "denoted" or "informed the court" of the possibility that Mr. Jacobs' judgment
could have been impacted and compromised (see Resp. Br., p.12), would have been
through the district court reaching that conclusion "by considering other facts and
deducing a logical consequence from them." See Inference, Black's Law Dictionary. In
other words, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Jacobs' judgment could have been
impacted and compromised, if it were drawn from the original mental health evaluation,
would have been an inference, not evidence.
Contrary to the State's argument, the ICC mental health assessments provided
new evidence. The ICC mental health assessments expressly report that "it is possible
that [Mr. Jacobs'] judgment could have been impacted [and] compromised in a
homeless [and] unsteady environment."

(Confidential Exs., p.60.)
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That report is

evidence, because it "tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact." See
Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary. Further, the original mental health evaluation (and
the presentence report) did not present any evidence that Mr. Jacobs' psychological
stressors could have impacted and compromised his judgment. (See Confidential Exs.,
pp.10-19, 26-32.)
In sum, the ICC mental health assessments provided new evidence. That new
evidence would have served as an important mitigating factor for Mr. Jacobs' sentence.
Thus, as shown in the Appellant's Brief (App. Br., pp.16-18), Mr. Jacobs presented
prima facie evidence of the ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's

failure to challenge the original mental health evaluation.

The district court's order

summarily dismissing Count One should be reversed, and the case should be
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Jacobs is entitled to resentencing
in light of his trial counsel's ineffective assistance.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, and the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Jacobs respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
summary dismissing, with prejudice, Count One of his amended petition for postconviction relief, and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Jacobs
is entitled to resentencing.
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2014.

?!?

~

-~---

BEN P. M C G R E ~ ~

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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